The Revolt of the Netherlands

“It was less any particular ability on the part of the Dutch than the foolishness of Philip II himself which decided the outcome of the Dutch revolt.” Discuss.

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Many factors determined the course and outcome of the Dutch revolt – a revolt that Professor Smit sees as “a number of revolts representing the interests and the ideals of various social, economic and ideological groups”. The strategies of William of Orange and then his son, Maurice of Nassau, were factors in Dutch achievement. The work of the population together against Philip II was also an important element in the success. Philip II’s foolishness can be defined as misjudgment on his part. The financial difficulties faced by Spain could be down to personal errors on Philip II’s part. His widespread military and economic commitments came to be an element of Philip’s foolishness as he had to switch his forces and attention between one situation and another before dealing conclusively with problems that he had been facing. As Philip’s advisors worked so closely with him, their mistakes can also be attributed to him to an extent.

Philip II’s attempts to centralise his lands paid no heed to the previous policies of Charles V concerning the Netherlands. While Charles V had respected the individual liberties of areas within the Netherlands, Philip II had no regard for them. Activities such as the persecution of heretics and the legal procedures concerning this cut across the rights of local tribunals. The Inner Council established by Philip, and headed by Granvelle, infringed the grandees’ right to be heard by the Regent. Philip’s actions were fuelling the fire of Dutch opposition rather than the Dutch showing particular skill in opposing the Spanish.

The move to centralise his lands with no regard for the people within them evidently held no memories for Philip when it came to the Union of Arms in 1626. This attempt at getting each province in Spain to provide troops to help other provinces was not popular. Again this move to centralise states had infringed on local rights. It highlights Philip II’s foolishness in his lack of respect for local liberties and his inability to learn from mistakes he made in the Netherlands. His ignorance of experience is also evident as he time after time refused to make religious concessions to the Dutch. It was not xenophobia that united so many of the Dutch against Philip II, but the conviction that he was not prepared to respect their liberties. If he had overridden those of his own people, the Dutch saw no reason for Philip to respect their rights. In this way, it was Philip’s foolishness aiding the determination of the Dutch to drive out Spanish influence.

Philip’s single minded nature against what he saw as heresy in the Netherlands angered many of the Dutch among whom there was a general attitude of religious toleration. While William of Orange was a committed Catholic, he could not “approve of princes attempting to rule the conscience of their subjects.” Philip’s actions against heresy therefore pitted a large number of Dutch against him: grandees, nobles, townsfolk, Calvinists, religious moderates. The defection of one group of the opposition would not end the revolt, so it continued, supported by many. Problems arose between the Catholic orthodoxy and religious compromise rather than Catholics and Calvinists. Therefore, religion was not necessarily splitting the Dutch. Philip’s dedication to the Catholic faith was supported by the devotees in the Netherlands, but they were not the local powerful force against the Dutch as Philip had hoped, simply because so many Dutch had a tolerant attitude towards religion.

The introduction of the Council of Troubles, or the Council of Blood as it became known, met with more opposition. Rumours spread that “the main purpose of the Council was steadily to destroy liberties in the same way as it was calmly taking lives.” Despite Alva demonstrating that he was prepared to undermine the authority of those around him by establishing the Council without informing the Regent, Margaret, Philip foolishly invited Alva to become Governor-General. The sheer ignorance of Alva regarding the Dutch was shown by his creation of the council to discuss Dutch affairs in Madrid “for only men untainted with the corruptions of service in the provinces could make the necessary objective and disinterested decisions to maintain sound and effective government there.” Perhaps disinterested is the operative word as still there was no consideration of Dutch requirements, only what the Spanish felt was best, and ultimately, the council was filled with existing administrators.

Alva’s actions concerning the Netherlands only served to anger the Dutch further. Due to his extensive commitments, Philip II could not afford to send further funds to Alva in the Netherlands. “A policy of pacification and reconciliation could only succeed if the army were kept under firm control, but the early 1570s…were a time of acute financial difficulty for Philip.” Over time, Philip had to deal with the Turks in the Mediterranean, the preservation of Catholicism in France, and the Armada in 1588 among other efforts. In order to raise his own money, Alva introduced the Tenth Penny Tax in 1570. Despite opposition, in 1571 Alva pressed forward with his plans as the income from another tax, the Hundredth Penny, drew to an end. As Alva threatened to collect the tax by force, the Estates of Artois, Flanders, Hainaut and Brabant sent deputies to Spain to protest to Philip II. He foolishly dismissed this chance to come to any kind of agreement with the Dutch. In the Netherlands, discontent rose as industries and trade suffered under tax and unemployment. The Dutch exiles had the ability to keep hatred of the Spanish interference alive within the Dutch people. The propaganda arriving in the Netherlands from the Dutch exiles was as much an attempt to turn favour from Alva and Philip II as it was to give the Dutch resolve to fight on further against the legislation being introduced by Alva that blatantly overrode their local privileges.

At first Philip II was uncertain as to whether he was sending Alva to the Netherlands to crush heresy or the revolt. Even without a certain aim, this force was sent to the Dutch to overpower them. The same lack of consideration was shown in the barbaric behaviour of the soldiers. Philip’s insistence on overstretching his power and resources resulted in an inability to pay his troops in the Netherlands. The “Spanish Fury” in Antwerp “had united sixteen out of the seventeen provinces, Catholic as well as Protestant, in a great effort to expel the Spaniard” as troops ransacked the town, sparing no one, killing young children and desecrating churches. The military prowess of William of Orange and his son, Maurice of Nassau “cannot ultimately explain why the Dutch endured and achieved so much.” William of Orange’s skill lies in using the behaviour of the troops and officials acting under Philip’s orders against the Spanish themselves. “It is they who must be blamed for deeds by which they openly disgrace themselves” he wrote as part of his propaganda campaign encouraging resistance. In support of the view that the militant actions of the troops brought Spain down, the Governor-General Requesens himself had said that the Netherlands would be lost by the actions of the disobedient soldiers rather than by the skill of the rebels.

While William of Orange was adept at using words to persuade and seeing the more truthful side of politics, for instance in his distrust of Don John of Austria, his son was more militarily talented. From 1587, he led the rebels. Under him, his troops contrasted strongly with the Spanish troops. The rebels had military training and were supplied with standardised equipment from depots. The Dutch showed more ability in this respect compared to the ill-advised negligence of Spanish troops by Philip II.

Philip II’s determination to centralise his states meant sending troops to the Netherlands. These men were then faced with unfamiliar geography and “the geographical configuration of the country…was to be the determining factor.” The Spanish troops had to negotiate fortified towns, bogs and large rivers and the disadvantage of long drawn-out communications. Parker believes that communications and a lack of cash help to explain Spain’s inability to exploit her military successes and her eventual failure to reconquer the Low Countries. Again overstretched resources meant shaky commitments from troops as for example, in 1588, Parma had to divert his much needed forces to the Spanish Armada. This was another example of Philip’s foolish over-commitment.

“Dutch success was made possible by the almost miraculous economic development of the country” as while resisting the actions of the Spanish and the Tenth Penny Tax, the Dutch worked on strengthening other parts of their land and recovering from weaknesses in their trade. The decline of the Hanseatic fish trade and the improvement of equipment and vessels made fishing in the rich spawning of the English Channel possible. As a result, the herring became a foundation of Dutch wealth. Philip’s foolishness meant that his first mishandled and underfunded troops needed reinforcements. The actions of the first troops had angered the Dutch. Philip saw the need for reinforcements to be sent to the Spanish troops in the Netherlands. However, when these reinforcements were to travel through the English Channel to reach the Netherlands – the only route by sea – they were defeated by Admiral Tromp at the Battle of the Downs.

The Dutch attempted to bring an end to the revolt by forming the Pacification of Ghent in 1576, which united the Dutch rebel and obedient provinces against the common enemy of the mutineers. They showed diplomatic sense by claiming not to be against Philip II, saying that the mutineers were an enemy of Spain too. This move by the Dutch shows consideration for a basis of reconciliation. On the Spanish side, Don John of Austria feigned sympathy for the Dutch but was an ultimately untrustworthy figure of compromise and negotiation.

The more successful Dutch policies of compromise came to light once more in the formation of the Union of Utrecht and the Union of Arras in 1579. Under the Union of Utrecht, the rebel provinces – the United Provinces – were united for war and peace and left other matters such as religion to particularism. The Union of Arras consisted of the provinces showing loyalty towards Spain, recognising the authority of the king and the dominance of Catholicism in return for the king’s recognition of the political rights of the citizens. While Parma managed to capture many of the Southern provinces, Philip II had learnt too late the basic lesson of compromise. Instead of imprisonment or death, Calvinists in these provinces could be exiled. Those who did joined the United Provinces, taking skill and, most importantly, capital with them. They played an important part in investing in trade and commerce, building up the economy and strength of the United Provinces to resist the Spanish.

While not always in direct control of situations in the Netherlands, Philip II did not necessarily make situations for his representatives there any easier. For example, in 1575 he suspended payments of the Castilian debt and declared bankruptcy due to spreading his finances too thinly too many times – placing Requesens in an impossible place to negotiate or control in the Netherlands. His continued over-commitment and inability to see the benefits of compromise exacerbated Spanish weakness through exhaustion of finance and manpower. Part of the ability of the Dutch lay in taking advantage of Spanish weaknesses. While Spanish troops were mutinous, Dutch rebels were disciplined and well trained. The main strength of the Dutch was the sheer number of people against Philip II. The rebels included people from all walks of life. The varied motives served only to make the revolt stronger and longer lasting. The ability to persevere in the face of adversity was a key to Dutch success as Philip II undermined Spanish force by his foolish debilitation of finance and force. Rather than a committed attempt to follow through one mission, be it religious, political or otherwise, Philip II made several inconclusive and essentially ineffective attempts at correcting what he thought to be wrong in countries around the world. The most important reason for Dutch success was perhaps most effectively summed up by William of Orange, when he advised his followers to “exert [themselves] to the utmost, however hopeless the situation, and persevere even when all attempts have been unsuccessful.

Â© Sarah Marchant

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